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ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND THE FAMILY
Priyasha Saksena'
The traditional notion ofafamily involves a group of personswho are linked by
blood and affinity, with the adult members responsibleforthe care of the children.

However, the traditional paradigm of afamily isfast being eroded, with the discovery
ofnew methods ofartificial reproduction and a change in societal mindsets, making
otherforms offamily structures acceptable. Family law however isstill based on the
traditional notion of afamily, and seems unable to adapt to the changing times. This
article is an attempt to examine some of the dilemmas that arise due the use of
artificial insemination as a method of reproduction, how the law in different
jurisdictions has dealt with them sofar and why expedient changes are necessary if
Indian law isto keep pace with societal transformations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1949, George Murdock propounded the theory of the universality of the
nuclear family, based on its performance of the four functions which he felt were
essential. The four functions were socialisation, economic co-operation, reproduction

and sexual relations. He considered nuclear families within an extended family system
to be separate units, each of which performed the four essential functions.' The nuclear
family began to be considered as an institution which, as an essential part of society,
performed several functions which contributed to the fulfilment of the basic needs of
S
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the society, and helped in perpetuating social order, However, with the growth of
industrial production in the developed world, the family began to be seen less as a
unit of economic production, with increasing attention being given to reproduction,
child rearing and socialisation. With the focus on the performance of two different
kinds of tasks, within the family, an unspoken specialisation arose. A conventional
family was seen as one where one adult worked outside the home, while the second
adult took care of the house and the children. Invariably, it was the husband who
was given the role of the breadwinner, and the wife was the one to stay at home and
look after the children. This rather static concept of a family, with gender-specific
roles being assigned to adults who are sexually associated, has come under increasing
criticism over the past few years, due to its propensity to distort the experiences of
women who work outside the home, as well as to ignore other non-traditional forms
of family structures and the diversity in family life.3
The criticism of the domestic division of labour has steadily eroded the
universal acceptance of the traditional concept of a family. Increasingly, there has
been the acceptance of unique and new family structures, which might have been
disapproved of at earlier points in time. This is due to several social, economic and
technological changes. Changes in social philosophy which emphasise the freedom
of the individual, have led to a profound transformation in the previously widely
accepted idea of the indissolubility of the marriage tie between two individuals.
Now, society is more open to accept divorces, extra-marital cohabitation and single
parent households, which contravene the functional perspective of a family, i.e. the
division of labour between the two adults of a nuclear family. These social changes
have also been partially responsible for economic changes, such as the growing
economic independence of many married women, which is due to the collapse of the
division of labour and the increase in the number of women who work outside the
home. Another major reason for the change in the concept of the family is the
development of modern science and technology, especially the development of
methods of artificial reproduction, such as artificial insemination, in-vitro
fertilisation, surrogacy, etc. These methods can result in legal imbroglios as they
involve difficult questions of parentage, parental responsibility and illegitimacy, all
of which affect the core of the concept of a family, which is based on the kinship ties
of marriage or blood.
These changes in the notion of a family have led to several problems as family
law, which determines the rights and obligations of various members of the family,
A. GIDDENS, SocIOLOGy 174-75 (2001).

J. N. Edwards, New Conceptions: BiosocialInnovations and the Family, (1991) 53(2) JOURNAL OF
MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 349,354-55.
W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 206 (1959).
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is based on the conventional paradigm of a family, and has adapted to these changes
in a very limited manner. This article is an attempt to examine the various legal and
ethical issues that arise due to artificial insemination by a donor and the way the
law has dealt with them. It also looks at the effect of the process of artificial
insemination on the concept of a family and the rights and obligations of the affected
parties, i.e. the child, the mother, the father and the donor.

11.

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION - FORMS AND PROCEDURE

Artificial insemination is one method out of several that are grouped together
as new reproductive technologies; the others being surrogacy and in-vitro fertilisation.
It is a widely-used and popular technique for artificial procreation used by childless
couples; its relative simplicity making it an extremely popular method. It involves
the artificial introduction of sperm into the uterus of a woman, usually with the help
of a syringe.5 There are three main forms of artificial insemination: homologous
artificial insemination [hereinafter "AI-l"], where a woman is inseminated with the
sperm of her husband; heterologous artificial insemination, or artificial insemination
by donor [hereinafter "AID"], where a woman is inseminated with the sperm of an
unknown donor; and combined artificial insemination [hereinafter "CAI"], where a
woman is inseminated with a mixture of the sperm of her husband and an unknown
donor.'
AIH is normally used when the husband is fertile, but impotent, and does not
pose much of a legal problem, as the woman is impregnated with the sperm of her
husband, and so, both husband and wife are the biological parents of the child. The
case of AID is more problematic. It is normally used when the husband is infertile.
Since the woman is impregnated with the sperm of an unknown donor, the child
born is the biological child of only the woman and not her husband. The introduction
of the third party complicates matters and leads to several problems of adultery,
illegitimacy, consent, consummation, inheritance etc. CAI is normally used for a
possible psychological benefit to an infertile husband, who may believe that the
child was born of his sperm and not that of the donor. This technique is not as
popular today as it was a few years ago as it has no medical superiority over the AID
process and hence is outside the purview of this article.'

A. RoyArtificial Insemination:Doctors' Dilemma in Ethics and Law, (2000)14(6) LEGAL NEWS AND
ViEws 39.
W. Wadlington, Artificial Concepion: The Challengefor Family Law, (1983) VA. L. REV. 465 as
sourced from P. N. SwisHa, H. A. MiLER AND W. I. WESTON, FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
403 (1990).
7
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AID is the most popular and the most legally complex of all the methods of
artificial reproduction. The reason for the complexity is the involvement of multiple
people in the process and the resultant effect on the rights and obligations of all the
involved parties. There is often a conflict among the rights of the different parties,
which leads to problems in determining their relative importance. Hence, it is difficult
to develop law in this respect, as law depends on the ability to hierarchise rights, in
order to provide for remedies for their violation.

III. AID,

ADULTERY AND ILLEGITIMACY

Historically, the rights of a child depended, to a large extent, on the fact of his
legitimacy or illegitimacy. Legitimacy or illegitimacy depended on the nature of the
relationship between the parents of the child at the time of his birth, i.e. if they were
married, then he was legitimate, if not, then he was illegitimate. Most illegitimate
children were denied any kind of rights. This was due to the fact that his birth was
outside the conventional model of a family, where the bond of marriage linked the
parents. Social disapproval of such'deviant' family structures led to strong reactions
against the birth of illegitimate children. The parents, especially the mother, were
treated as outsiders, and the child was not given the rights normally granted to a
child as against his parents. This is especially true in matters of succession, where
an illegitimate child is not considered to be a legal heir of both his biological parents,
and hence, cannot inherit property akin to a legitimate child.9
Whether a child born as a result of artificial insemination is legitimate or not
depends on whether his/her mother's impregnation constituted an act of adultery,
which is an act of sexual intercourse outside the institution of marriage. If it did, then
the child is illegitimate, but if not, then the child is legitimate. So, adultery and

8

L. LAMIERT AND J. SOEEATHER,

CHILDREN IN

CHANGING

FAMILIES

26-27(1980).

9 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 gives the general rules of succession in case of
males and § 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 gives the general rules of succession
in case of females. Both these sections mention that the property is to devolve on the
relatives of the deceased in a particular manner. § 3(1) (j) of the Hindu Succession Act,
1956 provides that relation means legitimate kinship and illegitimate children are only
deemed to be related to their mother and to each other. So, reading all the provisions
together, under Hindu law, an illegitimate child can inherit only from his mother and not
from his father. In case of Muslim law, there is a difference of opinion between the Shia
and the Sunni schools. As per the Shia school, an illegitimate child cannot inherit from
either of the parents, or from any other relative. However, as per the Sunni school, the
child is related to the mother and so, can inherit from the mother. The Indian Succession
Act, 1925, which governs succession among Christians and Parsis, only considers
legitimate kinship in order for people to be kindred, which is essential for a person to
inherit.
79

Vol. 20 (1)

NationalLaw School ofIndia Review

2008

illegitimacy, in the case of artificial insemination, are interrelated issues. 0 It has
been argued that in case of AID, not only the woman undergoing the treatment, but
also the doctor and the donor are adulterous; the doctor, because he introduces the
semen into the woman and the donor, because he becomes the father of a child from
a woman who is not his wife.
The first reported instance when the question of adultery was raised was in
the Canadian case of Orford v. Orford." The Court, in this case, held that "the essence
of the offence of adultery consists, not in the moral turpitude of the act of sexual
intercourse, but in the voluntary surrender to another person of the reproductive
powers or faculties of the guilty person; and any submission of those powers to the
service or enjoyment of any person other than the husband or the wife comes within
the definition of adultery."" This definition assumes significance because it shifts the
essence of adultery from the sexual act of penetration to any act that might introduce
a false strain of blood in the family."
In the United States, one of the earliest cases in this regard was Strnad v.
Strnad.4 The Court adopted a forward-looking stance and held that the parental
rights of the husband over a child born of AID were akin to those of an adoptive
father, thus holding that the child born was not illegitimate. However, this decision
was followed by a series of decisions that went the opposite way.
In Doornbos v. Doornbos,16 the court held that a child born of AID even with
the consent of the husband was illegitimate. The husband, therefore, was not the
father of the child, and hence, had no parental rights with respect to the child." A

"

12

G. P. Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Inseminationand the Law, (1968) 67(1) MICH.
L. Rav. 127, 134.
58 D.L.R. 251 (1921). In this case, the husband was living in Canada and the wife was
living in England. The husband filed for divorce on the grounds of adultery of the wife,
while the wife claimed that the child was born as a result of AID.
Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921) at 258.

'

Supra note 10, at 135.

"

78 N.Y.S.2d 390. In this case, after having a child through the process of AID, the husband
and wife separated. The husband filed a suit for visitation rights which the wife tried to
resist, on the grounds that the child was not that of the husband, but of an unknown,
third party donor.

"

Id.

"

139 N.E.2d 844. In this case, the wife filed a petition to obtain a judicial declaration that
the husband had no right over the child after divorce as the child was born as a result of
AID, and had not been legally adopted by the husband, and so, he was not the father of
the child, and hence, had no right over the child.
Doornbos v. Doombos, 139 N.E.2d 844.

1
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similar situation arose in Gursky v.Gursky.i There, the Court held that a child born
to a married woman through a father who was not her husband was illegitimate,
and hence, a child born as a result of AID was iHegitimate and the act of the mother
constituted adultery.1 9
The trend of declaring a child born of AID illegitimate and the mother
adulterous was reversed in People v. Sorensen." The court declared that a man who
had consented to his wife undergoing AID was the lawful father of the child born as
a result of the AID, and hence, was liable to pay child support after separating from
his wife. The court also said that paternity was established when a person purchased
semen and used it to inseminate his wife. In response to the arguments on adultery,
the Court held that it would be absurd for an act of AID to be classified as adultery
for the doctor, the donor or the woman undergoing AID, because the doctor may be
female, the donor may be thousands of miles away, or the husband may himself be
inserting the semen via a syringe. So, the process of AID is not adulterous for the
woman, the doctor or the donor.2
Later cases such as In Re Adoption of Anonymous" and Estate of Gordon3
have followed the pattern set by the judgement in People v. Sorensen.24 Both
judgements declared that a child born of AID, with the consent of the husband, is
considered to be legitimate and enjoys all the rights and privileges of a naturally
born child of the marriage.25

"

"
20

21
22

23

14
2-

242 N.Y.S.2d 406. In this case, a husband, after giving consent to his wife for undergoing
AID, claimed that lie was not the father of the child and so, would not have to pay child
support after separation.
Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406.
66 Cal. Rptr. 7. This was the first criminal case involving AID. A couple divorced after
having a child through AID and the husband did not pay child support. Criminal
proceedings were initiated against him under § 270 of the California Penal Code for
non-payment of child support.
People v. Sorensen, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7.
345 N.Y.S.2d 430. The case involved the adoption of a child born by AID by the second
husband of the mother of the child, who had had the child with the first husband. When
the first husband refused to give his consent to the adoption, it was contended by his
former wife and her husband that he was not the father of the child as the child was born
as a result of the process of AID, and so, his consent was not needed for the adoption to
take place.
501 N.Y.S.2d 969. A child was born as a result of AID with the consent of the husband of
the woman undergoing the treatment. It was questioned as to whether the child was a
descendent of the husband or not.
Supra note 20.
Supra note 22.
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As a result of the confusion emanating from the inconsistencies in the decisions
regarding the status of a child born as a result of AID, the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the USA developed the Uniform Parentage
Act, a Model Statute to deal with issues arising out of artificial insemination in 1973.
The proposal was wholly advisory and States were free to adopt, ignore or modify
the proposals made by the Conference. The Model Statute encourages the use of
physicians for the process of artificial insemination. It declares the husband to be the
legal father and legitimises the child; it also cuts off the relation between the child
and the donor. It requires consent to be in writing and makes provisions for the
recording and confidentiality of the consent. 29 States have legislations on artificial
insemination and out of these, 16 have adopted § 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act, or
some form of it.26
As per English common law, traditionally AID had not been thought to
constitute adultery, because the requirement for adultery has always been
penetration. This view was exhibited in Maclennan v. Maclennan, 7 where it was
held that sexual intercourse was needed to constitute adultery, and sexual intercourse
was defined so as to include the penetration of the female organ by the male organ;
since artificial insemination did not include such penetration, it could not constitute
adultery. However, the Court also held that if a married woman underwent AID
without the consent of her husband, it would constitute a grave and heinous offence
and could be made a separate ground for divorce or judicial separation."
26 D. Vetri, Reproductive Technologies and United States Law, (1988) 37(3) INT'L & Comr. L.Q. 505,

510. § 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act, 1973 provides: "(a) If, under the supervision of a
licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially
with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he
were the natural father of a child thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in
writing and signed by him and his wife. The physician shall certify their signatures and
the date of the insemination, and file the husband's consent with the State Department
of Health, where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the physician's
failure to do so does not affect the father and child relationship. All papers and records
pertaining to the insemination, whether part of the permanent record of a court or of a
file held by the supervising physician or elsewhere, are subject to inspection only upon
an order of the court for a good cause shown. (b) The donor of semen provided to a
licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a married woman other than the
donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of the child thereby
conceived."
2

(1958) Sess. Cas. 105. The case involved a petition by the husband for divorce on the
grounds of his wife's adultery he claimed that he was incapable of procreating, but his
wife had given birth to a child. The wife contended that the child was born as a result of
AID, which had been performed with her husband's consent. The husband denied to
have given consent and claimed that AID constituted adultery.

2

P Diwan, Technological Niyoga and Nirodh and Social Engineering through Law, (1980) 22(4)
JOURNAL or Tair INDIAN LAW INsrrrm 445,460.
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The statute governing artificial insemination in the UK is the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990. The Act provides that given the consent of
the husband, he is to be treated as the father of the child born to a married woman as
a result of AID. The donor is specifically excluded from paternity and so, enjoys
nearly complete freedom from parental responsibility. Anonymity of donors is also
protected?

As per Indian laws, AID cannot amount to adultery and a child born of AID is
not illegitimate. According to the Indian Penal Code like English law, to constitute
adultery, the act must constitute sexual intercourse, not amounting to rape, between
a man and a woman whom he believes to be another man's wife, without the consent
or connivance of the husband. In order to constitute sexual intercourse, penetration
is necessary? AID does not involve penetration, or physical union in the form of
coitus, hence, it cannot amount to adultery under Indian law." As to the question of
the legitimacy of a child born of AID, under the Indian Evidence Act, the legitimacy of
a child is presumed in the case of a valid marriage between the mother and the
father, in the absence of the evidence of non-access. So, for all practical and legal
"

J. K. MASON, R. A.

MCCALL SMrm AND G. T. LAURIE, LAW AND MEDICAL Ens
79-82 (2002). The
relevant portions of § 28 of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 1990 provide:

"(2) If- (a) at the time of the placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or of her
insemination, the woman was a party to a miscarriage, and (b) the creation of the

embryo carried by her was not brought about with the sperm of the other party to the
marriage, then, subject to subsection (5) below, the other party to the marriage shall be
treated as the father of the child unless it is shown that he did not consent to the placing
in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or to her insemination (as the case may
be)....(4) Where a person is treated as the father of the child by virtue of subsection (2)
or (3) above, no other person is to be treated as the father of the child.... (6) Where- (a)
the sperm of a man who had given such consent as is required by paragraph 5 of
Schedule 3 to this Act was used for a purpose for which such consent was required, or
(b) the sperm of a man, or any embryo the creation of which was brought about with his
sperm, was used after his death, he is not to be treated as the father of the child."
'

NELSON, INDIAN PENAL CODE 4595 (2003). § 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 provides:
"Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and whom he knows or has
reason to believe to be the wife of another man, without the consent or connivance of
that man, such sexual intercourse not amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the
either description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both.
In such case, the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor."

R. A.

31 A. Khan, Artificial Insemination and Surrogate Parenthood:An Indian Socio-Legal Perspective,
(1989) 31(3) JOURNAL OF TwE INDIAn LAW INSTITUTE 394, 401.
"

PRINCIPLES AND DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 1090 (1999). § 112 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 provides: "The fact that any person was born during the continuance
of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty
days after its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof
that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the
marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten."

M. MowiN,
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purposes, the husband can be regarded as the father of a child born of AID, unless he
proves his non-access and absence of consent to his wife for undergoing AID." So,
even though the child is not the biological offspring of the husband and the wife, the
child is not considered to be illegitimate and enjoys all the rights that a legitimate
child does.
Hence, even though the societal disapproval of illegitimacy continues, children
born as a result of AID are not affected due to the presumption of law as regards
parentage. Especially for the purposes of property rights, children born as a result of
AID are treated at par with children in a conventional family set-up. The existing
law has been able, in this case, to accommodate a non-traditional method of
reproduction.

IV. AID,

CONSENT AND RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

OF THE HUSBAND AND THE DONOR
The issues of consent and the obligations to the child born out of AID are
interrelated because unless consent has been proved, the husband does not have
any obligation towards the child. This is unlike a conventional family model, where
the parents of the child are responsible for his upbringing, and there is no question of
consent of the father to the birth of the child. Here, one can see a reflection of the clear
societal discrimination between children who are born naturally and those who are
born as a result of artificial means of reproduction. As artificial means of reproduction
such as AID are seen as violations of the basis of the traditional family structure, the
concept of rights and obligations for such new family structures, based on new
technology, are different and usually inferior to those that arise in a traditional
nuclear family structure.
Further, the traditional family structure never involved a third party in a
process as private as reproduction. With the advent of technology and artificial
means of reproduction which result in the involvement of an external party, there is
the necessity of outlining the rights and obligations of the donor with respect to the
child of whom he is the biological father.
There have been several decisions by courts on the issue of consent, rights and

obligations, mostly in the United States. One of the earliest cases in this regard was
Gursky v. Gursky,14 where, though the act of AID was considered to be adulterous,
the husband was held liable to support the child born as he had consented in writing
"

Supra note 31, at 404.

"

Supra note 18.
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to the procedure, and this was seen as an implied contract to support the child.3 The
same was also held when a similar situation arose in Anonymous v. Anonymous.
In People v. Sorensen," the husband was held criminally liable for non-payment of
support for a child born of AID to which he had consented." The case of KS v. GS
held that consent by the husband to the procedure of AID continues for further
artificial insemination procedures even after it has been revoked, with the onus on
the husband to prove that the consent had actually been revoked. 0 In, In Re Baby
Doe," the court held that consent need not be in writing; it could also be proved if the
husband knew of and assisted his wife in the procedure of artificial insemination,
and so, the husband could not deny that he was the father of the child in the absence
of written consent. So, in all cases where the husband has consented to his wife
undergoing AID, he is taken to be the father of the child, and hence, has all the
obligations that a natural father would have towards the child, including the
payment of child support.
Apart from the obligation to pay child support for a child born of AID, the
husband also has certain rights over the child; the rights being those like a foster
father, if not a natural father. In Stmad v. Stmada the father of a child born as a
result of AID was granted visitation rights after he separated from his wife, as he
was able to prove that he had consented to the procedure and hence was, at least
entitled to the same rights as a foster father." In, In Re Adoption of Anonymous," it
was held that the consent of the father of a child born as a result of AID is required for
the adoption of such a child by another person:
"

Supra note 18.

* 246 N.Y.S.2d. 835. The case involved an action for alimony and child support by a woman
against her husband. It was contended on behalf of the woman that the husband had an
obligation to support a child born of AID as he had consented to the procedure.
* Supra note 20.
" Supra note 20.
"

440 A.2d. 64. In this case, the husband contended that he was not liable to pay child
support for a child born as a result of AID, as he had revoked his consent to the procedure
after the first round of AID had resulted in a miscarriage for his wife, who later on
continued with the treatment.

353 S.E.2d. 877. In this case, the husband claimed that he was not liable to pay child
support for a child born as a result of AID as he had not consented to the procedure in
writing.
42 In Re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d. 877.
- Supra note 14.
4
Supra note 14.
5 Supra note 22.
" Supra note 22.
4'
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As per the Uniform Parentage Act, the consent of the husband of the woman
undergoing the treatment has to be in writing, but the absence of such consent does
not affect the father-child relationship in any way, and hence, the father will both
have an obligation to support the child, as well as have the right of visitation among
other rights.4 The Act also provides that the donor of the semen is not treated as the
natural father of the child, and so, he does not have either any right over the child or
any obligation towards the child.48
In England, as per the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, the husband
is treated as the father of the child born as a result of AID and hence, he has all the
rights and obligations that a natural father has over a child 4 The Act also specifically
precludes the donor from being treated as the father, and hence, he is excluded from
enjoying any rights or from having any liabilities with respect to the child born of
his semen9 0
In India, though there is no specific legislation on this matter, the position
should be the same as in England, as AID is not seen as adultery, nor is the child born
seen as illegitimate, hence, the husband will be treated as the father of the child, and
so, will have all the rights and obligations of a natural father with respect to the
child. The donor is not specifically precluded, by any legislation, from claiming rights
over the child, but these rights are not likely to be given to him, in order to reduce
legal complications and custody battles, as the husband is accepted as the father of
the child. So, in the clash of rights between the husband and the donor, the husband
is likely to get the upper hand as society is more prone to accept his relationship
with the child, even though it does not conform to the traditional notion of a family.
This is because it is still easier to accept such a relation than the one between the
child and a person who is completely external to the family structure.

V. AID,

ANONYMITY AND THE 'RIGHT TO KNOW'

The introduction of the external element in reproduction, and the subsequent
desire of the child born as a result of AID, complicates the traditional family set up,
where there is only one father and one mother. With AID, there are two fathers- one
who is the genetic father and one who is recognised as the father by virtue of giving
his consent to the procedure of AID. This disturbs the delicate balance within the
family structure.
4

§ 5(a) of the Uniform Parentage Act, 1973.
§ 5(b) of the Uniform Parentage Act, 1973.

§ 28(2) of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 1990,
- § 28(6) of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 1990.
4

86

Artificial Inseminationand the Family
Further, most donors do not wish to have any contact with their genetic
children. So, another clash of rights arises out of AID, i.e. the clash between the right
of the donor to remain anonymous and the right of the child to know his/her biological
father.
As per the Declaration of Geneva and the Code of Medical Council, doctors
have the duty to maintain absolute confidentiality regarding matters in which they
have rendered their professional expertise. There has been statutory recognition of
this duty in the form of the Specific Relief Act which allows for injunctions to be
given in case a doctor threatens to publish information regarding a person's medical
history or personal life. However, there may be certain circumstances where a doctor
might have to reveal the name of the donor, such as when parentage has to be known
in order to identify or treat a genetic disease.5
Anonymity of the donor may also lead to what is known as the 'incest
problem'. Since one donor's semen is used to impregnate more than one woman,
there arises a serious possibility of children of the same father but from different
mothers getting married due to the lack of knowledge of their biological relationship,
which results in an incestuous marriage. This problem arises as a child born of AID
usually knows only half of his/her true parentage?
In the United States, as per the Uniform Parentage Act, doctors are required to
keep a record of the consent of the husband, in case he later claims to have never
given it;" the record keeping does not extend to the donor. There have been demands
for the drafting of a statute which will both protect the privacy of the donor, as well
as cover the need of the child to ascertain his/her parentage. This can be done by
limiting the access to the records only to certain imperative circumstances?
In England, until recently the only provisions in this regard were in the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990. It provided for the maintenance of a register
of names of all those who had been treated, whose gametes had been stored or used
and who were born as a result of treatment services. So, any person above the age of
18, or a person above the age of 16 and intending to marry, could ask for information
as to his/her parentage if he/she was born as a result of treatment services. The
information did not extend to the identity of the person whose gametes have been

" Supra note 5, at 40.
52 P. Donovan, New Reproductive Technologies: Some Legal Dilemmas, (1986) 18(2) FAMILY
PERSFEcavE 57, 58.
§ 5(a) of the Uniform Parentage Act, 1973.
* Supra note 26, at 520.
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used, but to his ethnic type and genetic health.-3 However, there have been recent
additions to the law on this point. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations, 21004, provide access to a
greater range of information about the donors. Children born as a result of AID can
now apply to discover information such as the donor's name, his date of birth, the
town of his birth, the appearance of the donor and a short statement about the
donor. This, however, is prospective in application, and hence, applies only to
donations made on or after April 1, 2005. For donations prior to April 1, 2005, this
extension of information available is argued for on the basis of human rights.

" Supra note 29, at 82. The relevant portions of § 31 of the Human Fertilization and
Embryology Act, 1990 provide: "(2) Information falls within this subsection if it relates to
(a)the provision of treatment services for any identifiable individual, or (b) the keeping

or use of the gametes of any identifiable individual or of an embryo taken from any
identifiable woman, or if it shows that any identifiable individual was, or may have been,
born in consequence of treatment services....(3) A person who has attained the age of
eighteen ("the applicant") may by notice to the Authority require the Authority to
comply with a request under subsection (4) below, and the Authority shall do so if- (a)
the information contained in the register shows that the applicant was, or may have
been, born in consequence of treatment services, and (b) the applicant has been given
a suitable opportunity to receive proper counselling about the implications of compliance
with the request....(5) Regulations cannot require the Authority to give any information
as to the identity of a person whose gametes have been used or from whom an embryo
has been taken if a person to whom a license applied was provided with the information
at a time when the Authority could not have been required to give information of the
kind in question."
"6 The relevant portions of the Human Fertilization and Embryology (Disclosure of Donor
Information) Regulations, 2004 provide: "(2) This paragraph applies to information as
to - (a) the sex, height, weight, ethnic group, eye colour, hair colour, skin colour, year of
birth, country of birth and marital status of the donor; (b) whether the donor was adopted;
(c) the ethnic group or groups of the donor's parents; (d) the screening tests carried out
on the donor and information on his personal and family medical history; (e) where the
donor has a child, the sex of that child and where the donor has children, the number of
those children and the sex of each of them; (f) the donor's religion, occupation, interests
and skills and why the donor provided sperm, eggs or embryos; (g) matters contained
in any description of himself as a person which the donor has provided; (h) any additional
matter which the donor has provided with the intention that it be made available to an
applicant; but does not include information which may identify the donor by itself or in
combination with any other information which is in, or is likely to come into, the possession

of the applicant. (3) This paragraph applies to information from which the donor may be
identified which he provides after 31st March 2005 to a person to whom a licence applies,
being information as to - (a) any matter specified in sub-paragraphs (a) to (h) of paragraph
(2); (b) the surname and each forename of the donor and, if different, the surname and
each forename of the donor used for the registration of his birth; (c) the date of birth of
the donor and the town or district in which he was born; (d) the appearance of the donor;

(e) the last known postal address of the donor.
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In R (on the application of Rose) v Secretary of State for Health," the court held that
children born of assisted reproduction have the right to determine their genetic
parents as a result of the rights enshrined in Article 8 of the European Convention of
Human Rights. However, the court also interpreted Article 8 to include the right of
privacy of the donor when the donor was promised anonymity at the time of the
donation. The court did not balance these two righ ts and so, the position of donations
made before April 1, 2005 still remains unclear."
Countries like Sweden have recognised the right of a child to discover the
identity of the donor, but there is no duty on the part of the parents to inform the
child that he/she was conceived by AID. So, the right to know depends on the
discretion of the parents. Other countries, such as Switzerland, France and Canada,
have completely safeguarded the donor's privacy.0
India has no legislatLion on this issue, and hence, the clash between the right to
privacy and the right to know in the context of artificial insemination still remains.
There is no statute that gives the child the right to know his genetic parents in case
he is born by the use of artificial procreation methods. However, the right to privacy
has been given the status of a fundamental right by judicial interpretation. Courts
have interpreted Article 21 of the Indian Constitution to include the right of privacy."
Hence, the right of the donor to remain anonymous will be treated as superior to the
right of the child to know the identity of his genetic father.

VI AID,

UNMARRIED WOMEN AND LESBIANS

The traditional notion of a family is that of a nuclear family with both a father
and a mother. The very idea of a single-parent household or a homosexual partnership
violates the basis of the traditional nuclear family. Since AID can be used by single
" [2002] 3 F.C.R. 731 as sourced from

J. HERRING, MEDICAL LAW AND ETutcs 315 (2006).

" Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights provides- "Right to respect for
private and family life- (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family
life, his home and his correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and
is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others." This has frequently been interpreted to include positive obligation on the part
of the State as well. Hence, the State is also to take steps to do something for the
enforcement of these rights.
9 Supra note 30, at 83.
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Supra note 5, at 40.
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women or lesbian couples for procreation, it is a threat to the traditional concept of
a family.
There is no explicit law on the use of AID by umarried women or lesbians to
conceive a child, and so, a doctor will have to decide on ethical grounds whether to
proceed with the procedure, given the circumstances. It has been argued that
unmarried women and lesbians also feel the same need to have a child and should
not be denied a child because of the absence of a husband; also, since they are not
barred from conceiving children by natural means, they should not be barred from
using the procedure of AID. Opponents of the use of AID by unmarried women and
lesbians have argued that the best interests of the child should be kept in mind.
Therefore, in order that a child does not lead a disadvantaged childhood due to the
absence of a father, AID should be performed only on married women. 62 Also, it will
be unfair to make the donor of the sperm responsible for the child if he donated it on
the understanding that it would be used to inseminate a married woman, for whose
child he would have no obligations towards, and instead, it were used for the
insemination of an unmarried woman, whose child he would be responsible to
support. 3
The law with regard to this issue is ambiguous. Though the Uniform Parentage
M
several states in the United
Act has the words 'husband', 'wife' and 'married',"
States of America have made amendments while adopting the law to imply that
even unmarried women can undergo AID and bear children.'
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act in the UK places emphasis on
the welfare of the child born of AID, and requires that the need for a father be looked
into." So, though the law may not explicitly ban the use of AID by unmarried women
or lesbians, it may make clinics very restrictive in their acceptance of unmarried or
lesbian patients.6 7 The practice of allowing doctors to make social judgements about
the suitability of some persons to be parents is ethically debatable. Considering the

61

M. P.JAIN, INDIAN CoNsTrrUTIONA. LAw 1325 (2003).
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Supra note 29, at 78.
Supra note 26, at 515.
§ 5 of the Uniform Parentage Act, 1973.

6

Supra note 26, at 512-13.

62
6

6
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The relevant portion of §13 of the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act, 1990 provides:
"(5) A woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless account has been
taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the treatment (including
the need of that child for a father), and of any other child who may be affected by the
birth."
Supra note 29, at 79.
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need for a father has been vociferously criticised in recent years as it prioritises the
notion of a traditional family, and disregards the diversity of family structures in
modern times. This forces doctors and clinics to adhere to one particular view as
regards the family, where there is both the father and the mother." This consideration
is also erroneously based on the idea that single-parent households provide "limited
resources, less potential for emotional support within the household and reduced
possibilities for assistance with various household and child care risks" 0 and also
forces the child to take more adult responsibilities at an earlier age 1 The rigidity
and anachronism of these ideas has led to a change in perception. Though the Human

Fertilisation and Embryology Act still focuses on the welfare of a child as regards his
need for a father, but the Code of Practice of the Human Fertilisa tion and Embryology

Authority now focuses entirely on the ability of the woman, and of others in her
immediate social circle, to meet the needs of the child, in the case of artificial
insemination of a single woman.'
In India, the lack of legislation leaves the question as to the necessity of marriage
unanswered. However, the same criteria used in the case of adoption can be used for
AID. The Central Adoption and Resource Agency provides a set of guidelines which
are to be used by adoption centres when deciding whether the applicant is suitable
to be a parent. These guidelines are specific to adoption; however, they can be suitably

6

S D.

PAThNSON, MEDICAL LAW AND

Emics 249-50 (2006).

M. J. Smith, The Social Consequences of Single Parenthood: A Longitudinal Perspective, (1980)
29(1) EAmaxy RELATIos 75.
70 L.N. Richards and C.J. Schmrtiege, Problems and Strengthsof Single-ParentFamilies:Implications
for Practiceand Policy, (1993) 42(1) FAMY RELATIONS 277, 278.
n CODE OF RAcncE 31-32 (2003). '[3.11 of the Code provides: "Those seeking treatment are
entitled to a fair assessment. Treatment centres are expected to conduct the assessment
with skill and care, and have regard to the wishes and sensitivities of all those involved.
This assessment is expected to take into account the following factors relating to patients:

(i) The commitment to raise children (ii) The ability to provide a stable and supportive
environment for a child/children (iii) Immediate and family medical histories (iv) The
age, health and ability to provide for the needs of a child/children (v) The risk of harm to

children including: (a) inherited disorders or transmissible disease (b) multiple births (c)
problems arising during pregnancy (d) neglect or abuse (e) the effect of a new baby or

babies upon any existing child of the family." 13.13 of the Code provides: "Where
donated gametes are used, treatment centres are expected to take into account the
following additional factors: (i) A child's potential need to know about their origins and

whether or not the prospective parents are prepared for the questions which may arise
while the child is growing up (ii) Family attitudes towards such a child (iii) Implications
which may arise if the donor is known within the child's family or social circle (iv) The
possibility of disputed fatherhood." Para 3.14 of the Code provides: "Where the child
will have no legal father the treatment centre is expected to assess the prospective
mother's ability to meet the child's/children's needs and the ability of other persons
within the family or social circle willing to share responsibility for those needs."
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modified to suit the process of AID. The guidelines clearly mention that a single
person can be considered to be suitable parent if he/she has additional family support
system? This can be taken into consideration even when a decision on the suitability
of a woman of being a parent by the mode of AID is made. If a single woman is
considered a suitable parent for adoption, it seems unreasonable to think that she
will be unsuitable as a parent for AID. The recognition of adoption by single persons
has already weakened the traditional notion of a family, and hence, the recognition
of AID as a means of procreation for single women will not be a new addition to the
modern notion of a family, as both lead to the foundation of single-parent households.

VII.

CONCLUSION

There is little divergence of opinion on the issue that the changes in society
should be reflected in the changes in law. Unfortunately, this has not been the case of
family law, which has remained static and unresponsive to the fast-changing concept
of the family. Part of the problem lies in the rigid thinking of the majority of society,
which is unable to accept the changes that have occurred in the nature of the family
over a period of time. Since the thinking of society has not changed, law, too, has not
embraced the changes, and hence, there is a lacuna in the law, which has not developed
in order to deal with new concepts, family structures and technologies.
Since family law is based on the traditional notion of a family, i.e. a nuclear
family whose members are related by blood or marriage; the members being the
mother, the father and the children, it makes it difficult for family law to be applicable
n

1-1.1.7 of the Central Adoption and Resource Agency Guidelines provide: "Criteria for
Prospective Adoptive Parents: a) Marital Status, Age and Financial Status with
reasonable income to support the child and clear police record should be evident in the

Home Study Report. b) Prospective adoptive parents having composite age of 90 years
and less and where neither parent has crossed 45 years can be considered for adoption
of Indian children. These provisions may be suitably relaxed in exceptional cases for
reasons clearly stated in the Home Study Report. However, in no case should the age of
the prospective adoptive parent(s) exceed 55 years. c) In case of Special Needs children
with medical problems, the age limit of adoptive parent(s) may be relaxed by concerned
State Government. d) Single persons who have not crossed the age of 45 years and who
fulfil the other criteria can also adopt. e) The prospective parent(s) should have a regular
source of income with a minimum average monthly income of at least Rs.3000/- per
month. However, lower income will be considered taking into account other assets and
support system i.e. own house etc. f) All the criteria mentioned above for adoptive
parents will also apply to single parents with the additional requirements given below:(1) Age: Age of the adoptive single parent should be above 30 years and below 45
years. (2) Age Difference: The age difference between the adoptive single parent and
adoptive child should be 21 years. (3) Family: The single parent should have additional
family support system."
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to new kinds of family structures, such as those that might not have two parents, or
those that might consist of members who are not related by blood or marriage. As
this article has shown, one of the greatest challenges to family law is due to the
development of new reproductive technologies, which are methods of artificial
reproduction. The introduction of an external element in the intensely private process
of reproduction has led to a variety of complications as regards the notion of a
family. In case of AID, the parties who are affected by it are the donor, the parents,
especially the father and the child who is born as a result of the process of AID. The
donor and the parents have rights and obligations with respect to the child born,
and the child has rights as against his parents and the donor. Often these rights are
conflicting and the lack of legislation makes it difficult to hierarchise them and decide
on their relative importance.
There is the need for a comprehensive legislation in order to deal with the
various legal and ethical issues that arise due to the use of new reproductive
technologies. This can incorporate some provisions of existing law which have dealt
with the problems that have arisen to some extent. The problem with the existing
law is that it is too scattered, vague and incomplete to substantively deal with any
of the legal complications that arise due to the use of artificial methods of procreation.
In case of AID, the rights of the child, the donor and the parents assume special
importance. Many of the rights of the child, especially property rights, are based on
whether it is legitimate or not. Since this is connected with the question as to whether
the process of AID amounts to adultery or not, a satisfactory legislation has to deal
with both these aspects together. The argument that AID amounts to adultery is
unsound and can be defeated by adopting the definition of adultery in criminal law,
which is the act of sexual intercourse outside the institution of marriage, and requires
penetration in order to be complete. Since this is clearly not the case in case of AID, it
cannot be considered to be adultery. The legitimacy of the child born as a result of
AID, which is currently based on the presumptions of evidence law, should be clearly
enunciated in order to protect the rights of the child.
The rights and obligations of the husband and the donor also need to be codified
in order to balance conflicting rights. The purpose of AID is for involuntarily childless
couples to get a chance to fulfil their desire for children. Hence, giving the husband
the right to be the father of the child, coupled with being given the obligations of
upbringing of the child, is logical corollary. Giving the donor rights over the child
would not help fulfil the purpose of AID, which is to satisfy the desire of couples for
children. Since rights and obligations go hand in hand, if the donor is not given any
rights over the child, then making him responsible for and obligated towards the
child would be unfair.
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The balance between the right of the child born as a result of AID to know his
parentage and the right of the donor to remain anonymous also needs to be drawn
by legislation. A child has the right to identify his genetic parentage, yet the right of
the donor to remain anonymous is a part of his right to privacy, which needs to be
respected. Hence, the child should only be allowed a selection of information about
the donor on his application, such as his ethnic group, age, eye and hair colour,
religion, occupation, reasons for donation of sperm, etc. Such information would not
compromise on the privacy of the donor, and would also provide sufficient
information to the child as to the nature of his genetic father.
Lastly, the law needs to deal with issues such as the suitability of some persons
to undergo AID. Most of the decisions on suitability are based on erroneous
presumptions as to the parental capability of some people, especially in the context
of their marital status. The law in this regard should be based on the law of adoption,
which bases the selection of adoptive parents on their ability to provide for the
child, and not on their marital status. Hence, there should be no problems for single
women adopting the process of AID for having children.
All the legal problems and conflicts of rights in the process of AD arise due to
the static concept of the family which has not developed to include new forms of
family structures, and consequently, family law, which is based on the traditional
notion of the family, has not been able to encompass the changes in society due to the
introduction of modern technology. The primary challenge before family law today
is thus to adjust itself to the modern notions of family structures, in order to truly
accomplish its purpose of determining the rights and obligations of the various
members of a family.
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